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Zusammenfassung 
 
Der Schwerpunkt der europäischen Klimapolitik liegt derzeit auf der Umsetzung der in 2007 
verkündeten Ziele, die Treibhausgasemissionen bis 2020 um 20 Prozent gegenüber 1990 zu 
mindern. Die Vermeidung soll auf bis zu 30 Prozent gesteigert werden, falls wichtige 
Handelspartner vergleichbare Anstrengungen unternehmen. Diese Ziele für Europa sind 
eingebettet in die Europäische Grundhaltung, dass alle entwickelten Länder ihre 
Treibhausgasemissionen bis 2050 gegenüber 1990 um 60 bis 70 Prozent reduzieren sollten. 
Ohne die aktive Teilnahme der Vereinigten Staaten – dem weltgrößten Emittenten von 
Treibhausgasen – erscheinen solche Klimaziele allerdings unrealistisch. Trotz der 
ablehnenden Haltung der Bush-Administration zum Protokoll von Kyoto und der kritischen 
Position in Verhandlungen über ein Folgeabkommen deuten aktuelle Entwicklungen in der 
amerikanischen Klimapolitik einen Richtungswechsel an. Es befinden sich sogar einige 
weitreichende und realistische Vorschläge bereits im Gesetzgebungsverfahren im US-
Kongress. 
Die meisten dieser Gesetzesvorschläge im 110. Kongress der Vereinigten Staaten beinhalten 
ein umfassendes Emissionshandelssystem ähnlich dem in der Europäischen Union. Dieser 
Aufsatz stellt die wichtigsten Eckdaten der Vorschläge (Lieberman-Warner, Bingaman-
Specter, Lieberman-McCain, Kerry-Snowe und Sanders-Boxer) zusammen und zieht den Ver-
gleich zu entsprechenden Vorschlägen innerhalb der Europäischen Union. Während die 
geplante Emissionsminderung in den Vereinigten Staaten auf mittlere Frist eher moderat 
ausfällt, ist sie für den Zeithorizont bis Mitte des Jahrhunderts durchaus in der 
Größenordnung vergleichbar mit den Zielen der Europäischen Union. In einigen Bereichen – 
etwa bei Maßnahmen zur Verhinderung von Abwanderung emissionsintensiver Produktion in 
nicht regulierte Länder – ist Kooperation oder zumindest eine Koordination der 
Politikmaßnahmen in beiderseitigem Interesse. In anderen Bereichen – etwa der Regulierung 
des Verkehrssektors – könnte die EU womöglich durchaus von den Erfahrungen in den 
Vereinigten Staaten lernen. Im Gegensatz zur Entwicklung der Klimapolitik in der EU, in der 
ambitionierte Klimapolitik typischerweise von der Kommission initiiert wird, zeigen wir, dass 
in den USA oftmals eine fragmentierte Regulierung auf der einzelstaatlichen Ebene die 
treibende Kraft für nationale Aktivitäten ist. 
Schließlich bieten wir eine Kurzfassung der klimapolitischen Positionen der aussichtsreichen 
Kandidaten für die Präsidentschaftswahlen in 2008, da sie alle (Senatoren McCain-R, Clinton-
D und Obama-D) mindestens einen der einflussreichen Gesetzesvorschläge im US-Senat 
unterstützen. 
Es ist wahrscheinlich, dass die Vereinigten Staaten künftig eine einflussreiche Rolle in der 
internationalen Klimapolitik einnehmen. Das könnte diesen Prozess beschleunigen, wird aber 
in verschiedener Hinsicht auch die europäischen Positionen kritisch hinterfragen und 
herausfordern, anstatt lediglich einen Kyoto-ähnlichen Nachfolgeprozess zu unterstützen. 
  
Non-technical Summary 
 
European climate policy is on its way to implement the policy instruments required to achieve 
the ambitious abatement goals announced earlier in 2007, which are to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions by 20 percent by 2020 (versus 1990), regardless of comparable action by the main 
trading partners. If trading partners engage in comparable efforts, abatement can be increased 
to 30 percent. This policy is embedded in the European position that all developed countries 
should reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 60 to 80 percent by 2050, compared to 1990 
levels. 
However, without participation of the United States, the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse 
gases, mitigation of global climate change seems hardly conceivable. Despite the U.S. 
rejection of the Kyoto Protocol and the reluctance of the Bush administration to engage in 
Post-Kyoto negotiations, recent developments suggest that the U.S. position towards climate 
policy might change in the medium run. In fact, substantial and credible proposals are debated 
and developed in the legislative process.  
Most of the relevant proposals in the 110th U.S.-Congress suggest an extended cap-and-trade 
scheme for the United States, basically similar to the European emissions trading scheme. 
This paper summarizes the main features of those bills (sponsored by Lieberman-Warner, 
Bingaman-Specter, Lieberman-McCain, Kerry-Snowe, and Sanders-Boxer) and compares 
them to the recent developments in the European Union. While the U.S. proposals seem less 
stringent in the medium term, the order of magnitude of envisaged emission abatement in the 
middle of the century is comparable to the goals of the European Union. In some areas – such 
as border measures in order to prevent industrial production (and emissions) to move to non-
regulated regions – co-operation or at least co-ordination is in the interest of both regions. In 
other areas – such as the scope of the trading scheme or the policy in the transport sector – 
Europe may well learn from experiences gained  in the United States. As opposed to the 
evolution of climate policy in the European Union, where ambitious climate policy is often 
initiated by the Commission, we show that in the U.S. much of the federal legislation is driven 
by action on the state level. 
Finally, we provide an overview on the presidential candidates’ position towards climate 
policy, since all of the relevant candidates (Senators McCain-R, Clinton-D, and Obama-D) 
have up to now sponsored or co-sponsored at least one relevant climate bill in the Senate.   
On the whole it seems possible that the United States will take an influential role in the 
international climate policy process in the future. Thus North America may move forward 
international policy but will also challenge the European position in many respects rather than 
simply support any Kyoto-type process. 
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1. Introduction 
European climate policy is on its way to implement the policy instruments required to achieve 
the ambitious abatement goals announced earlier in 2007, which are to reduce the greenhouse 
gas emissions by 20 percent by 2020 (versus 1990), regardless of comparable action by the 
main trading partners. If trading partners engage in comparable efforts, abatement can be 
increased to 30 percent. However, this policy is embedded in the firm European position that 
all developed countries should reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by 60 to 80 percent by 
2050, compared to 1990 levels (COM 2008). This obviously extends beyond the direct scope 
of European policy and can therefore not be accomplished by political action within the EU-
27. On the other hand it is sensible to relate the regional long-term goals to action by the main 
trading partners – as the EU has explicitly done for the period until 2020 – for at least two 
reasons: firstly, in order to avoid being the loser in the prisoners’ dilemma game by providing 
too much of the costly public good of climate protection, and secondly in order to avoid 
global inefficiencies by forcing one region to incur high costs of emission abatement while 
comparable investments could have achieved substantially more abatement in other – less 
ambitious – emission constrained regions. 
In this respect the United States play a unique role in many respects. As the world’s largest 
economy it is the largest consumer of fossil energy and correspondingly the largest emitter of 
greenhouse gases (GHG). Current U.S. GHG emissions amount to 7,075.6 MtCO2e and are 
15.1 percent higher than emissions in 1990 (EIA 2007a). Furthermore, while the U.S. is by far 
the most important buyer of EU exports (23 percent of overall EU-27 exports in 2006), the 
country is the second largest exporter of merchandise into the EU (13 percent), topped only 
by China (14 percent) (Eurostat 2007a). With these relations in mind it is obvious that 
European policy should have an interest in observing U.S. climate policy and possibly 
identifying areas where co-operation or at least co-ordination can be mutually beneficial.  
Anthropogenic climate change has been officially accepted by the United States as a global 
problem. The U.S. has signed and ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change. The country has, however, refrained from ratifying the Kyoto Protocol to 
this Convention, which would have further specified absolute abatement targets for the 
developed nations. This has led to criticism and skepticism in many parts of the world. 
Especially in relation to the European longer term goals concerns are voiced not only because 
of the impression that the largest emitter is reluctant to contribute to the global effort of 
mitigating climate change. In fact, the position of the United States is seen to have caused a 
deadlock on the further development of global climate policy: Large and growing emitters in 
the developing world such as India and most notably China have used the reluctance of the 
United States to join the Kyoto regime to argue categorically against any carbon constraints 
on their economies, while on the other side the U.S. Senate – the body which has to ratify any 
international agreement – has passed the Byrd-Hagel resolution in 1997 with a 95-0 vote 
1 
stating that substantial climate policy measures be implemented only if the emerging 
economies such as China and India accept some constraints.1 The discussion on whether to 
join Kyoto or not has diverted the international attention away from the actual developments 
in climate policy within the United States. Nevertheless, a number of developments suggest 
that the U.S. position towards climate policy and – possibly even more – its international 
perception might change in the medium run. The traditional focus of the European media on 
the federal level of U.S. politics might have understated important developments on the 
regional level such as the initiatives in California or the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in 
the Northeast in recent years. In addition, a higher acceptance of national climate policy in the 
United States (see, e.g., ABC News et al. 2007) comes along with a sheer flood of proposals 
in both chambers of the U.S. Congress – where one of those bills is in fact sponsored by the 
republican presidential candidate. More often than it is the case in Europe, motivation of 
climate policy is not restricted to fighting climate change but includes aspects such as “energy 
independency” or “energy security” in a broader sense – sometimes these considerations 
actually outweigh the climate arguments. Similarly, the role of technology support tends to be 
more relevant in U.S. proposals. However, all relevant presidential candidates have put 
climate policy on their agenda and have in a sense committed themselves to take action. 
For European climate and energy policy in order to work towards its long-term goal it is 
necessary to be aware of current policies and trends in the United States. Carbon regulation in 
the EU and in the U.S. will eventually concern the firms responsible for a large part of 
international trade and emissions. Thus it is in the interest of both European trade and climate 
policy, to avoid putting European companies at a competitive disadvantage caused by 
inefficient, incompatible or simply systematically different regulations. Due to the size of the 
U.S. economy, resource use and emissions, a promising stable longer term international 
climate regime without a leading role of the United States is not realistic. Therefore, enhanced 
communication concerning the national as well as international climate policy instruments 
and institutions between the United States and Europe seems a prerequisite in order to 
motivate the large emerging economies to take part in any international regime. 
This study provides an overview on current trends in U.S. climate policy in the sense that the 
main elements of national climate policy proposals (see section 2.1) and state-level proposals 
(section 2.2) are described in more detail. In doing so, main features of the proposals are 
compared to recent trends in European climate policy. This will be complemented by a 
description of the climate policy contents in the U.S. presidential candidates’ agendas (section 
2.3). Based on this overview, section 3 is dedicated to identifying aspects interesting and 
important to Europe when it comes to designing a climate policy that works towards an 
                                                 
1 The resolution (S. 98 1997, p. 4) states that “…the United States should not be a signatory to any … agreement 
… which would (A) mandate new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the Annex I 
Parties, unless the … agreement also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within the same compliance period, or (B) would 
result in serious harm to the economy of the United States …” 
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involvement of the U.S. and thereby towards achieving the longer term goal of stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations. 
2. Climate Policy in the United States 
In the following we provide an overview on national U.S. climate policy, corresponding 
proposals and regional initiatives. On the one hand there has been considerable activity in the 
110th Congress since a whole string of bills directly aimed at climate policy have been 
debated in the Senate respectively House committees. In addition to the federal level, climate 
policy on the level of states or groups of states is further developed. Among the most 
prominent activities are the ambitious legislation in California and the Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative (RGGI).  
2.1 Federal Marked-Based Climate Change Proposals 
The 110th Congress has seen several new and modified cap-and-trade proposals, for example 
Lieberman-Warner (S. 2191 2007), Bingaman-Specter (S. 1766 2007), Lieberman-McCain 
(S. 280 2007), Kerry-Snowe (S. 485 2007), and Sanders-Boxer (S. 309 2007).2 As this 
selection of bills gives a good impression of the diversity and main pattern of the ongoing 
discussion within the 110th Congress we will focus on these cap-and-trade proposals and give 
a short description of their main properties. We organize our discussion by the following 
design elements of cap-and-trade schemes: (1.) scope and point of regulation, (2.) emissions 
targets, (3.) allowance allocation, (4.) price stability and cost control, (5.) international 
aspects, and (6.) provisions for technology programs.3 Finally, expected carbon dioxide prices 
and impacts on the economy are discussed. To foster an informed discussion about the 
differences between both approaches, the main features of the U.S. cap-and-trade schemes are 
compared with recent proposals by the European Commission. 
2.1.1 Main Features of Selected Proposals in the 110th Congress 
Scope and point of regulation 
All of the considered proposals are economy-wide and cover all six GHGs (CO2, CH4, N2O, 
HFCs, PFCs, and SF6). The less detailed proposals (Kerry-Snowe, Sanders-Boxer) which 
cover total U.S. emissions do not specify the point of regulation. This has to be done by the 
                                                 
2 For the sake of brevity we simply mention the main sponsors.  
3 This part of the paper is partly based on Arimura et al. (2007), who give a comprehensive overview on recent 
U.S. climate policy. As we focus on economy wide cap-and-trade proposals, we do not consider other climate 
related bills here such as cap-and-trade proposals only for the electricity sector or proposals of a carbon tax (see 
Arimura et al. 2007). 
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president or the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The more detailed proposals 
specify the point where regulation is enforced,  the coverage is between 75 and 80 percent of 
total U.S. emissions (RFF 2008). Bingaman-Specter, Lieberman-McCain, and Lieberman-
Warner regulate a mixture of downstream emitters as well as some upstream entities. 
Lieberman-Warner, for instance, propose an upstream system for transport fuels and natural 
gas but downstream regulation for electric utilities and other large industrial sources. All the 
bills require the EPA to set up and administer the cap-and-trade system. 
Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions in the European Union is generally downstream for 
all the activities covered by the European emissions trading scheme (EU ETS), i.e. mainly the 
energy intensive industry and the power sector covering roughly 40 percent of the carbon 
emissions. In the other sectors the point of regulation is largely left to member state 
legislation, i.e. sectors where up-stream regulation is proposed in the influential U.S. bills are 
often not included in the EU ETS at all. A major difference can therefore be expected in the 
regulation of transport fuels and fuels for private heating. While the U.S. proposals lack the 
precise design of the regulation yet, an upstream point of regulation may allow for better 
integrating the regulation of transport and private heating on the one hand, with the energy 
intensive emitters on the other. This division in the European regulatory scheme remains a 
potential source of considerable inefficiencies.4  
Emissions targets 
Table 1 shows the emission targets of the cap-and-trade bills for the covered sectors. The 
proposals include short-term (to 2020) as well as long-term (to 2050) targets. In general, the 
proposals with less detailed rules (Kerry-Snowe, Sanders-Boxer) tend to have more stringent 
targets along with a higher coverage. For instance, Sanders-Boxer proposes a long-term 
reduction of GHG emissions in the covered sectors by 80 percent below 1990 levels until 
2050. Bingaman-Specter and Lieberman-Warner have less stringent targets. The actual 
stringency of the regulation, however, will depend not only on the targets for single years but 
also on other features of the bill such as the rules for offset activities or the use of mechanisms 
such as safety valves or banking and borrowing.5 Therefore, an additional way to compare the 
bills is by the cumulated total emissions - i.e. of covered and non-covered sectors - between 
2010 and 2050 (see Table 1). We see that all bills reduce the cumulated total emissions 
compared to the BAU considerably (between 38 and 54 percent) but there is also some 
heterogeneity with respect to stringency of regulation. 
                                                 
4 See Böhringer and Lange (2005) for a discussion of causes and magnitude of inefficiencies caused by 
regulation of EU carbon emissions. 
5 Under so-called “safety valves” the government offers to sell allowances in unlimited amounts at a fixed price, 
possibly at levels rising over time. Banking refers to abating below the level of allowances available in a period 
and using the extra allowances for emissions in future years. Borrowing is the reverse, using allowances from the 
future against emissions today. 
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From the European perspective two aspects of the emissions targets in Table 1 are 
noteworthy. Firstly, given the long-lasting U.S. resistance against binding reduction 
commitments, the targets appear ambitious. This holds all the more if we consider the 
expectations for U.S. key economic indicators over this time period. U.S. population, for 
instance, is expected to rise from 309 million to 420 million, i.e. by 35.9 percent, between 
2010 and 2050 (U.S. Census 2007). In the same period, the EU-25 population is projected to 
decrease from 464 million to 450 million or by 3.1 percent (Eurostat 2007b). Furthermore, 
projections also show a much stronger long-term GDP growth for the U.S. than for the EU-
27.6 Secondly, one has to note that the targets for 2050 at least for the covered sectors are 
compatible with the order of magnitude of the European long-term vision for the whole 
developed world. Given the coverage of the regulation and the potential use of offsets in the 
U.S., until 2020 the targets seem somewhat less ambitious as compared to the EU-27, aiming 
at minus 20 percent in 2020 versus 1990 corresponding to minus 14 percent versus 2005 
(decomposed into 21 percent in the sectors covered by emissions trading and 10 percent iny 
all the other sectors). 
 
Table 1: Emissions Targets for Covered Sectors and Cumulated Total Emissions 
Targets for covered sectors1 Proposed Bill 
2020 Cap 2050 Cap 
Cumulated total emissions2  
2010-2050 in GtCO2 
(reduction vs. BAU in %) 
Lieberman-Warner -19% below 2005 level -71% below 2005 levels 193.8  (-52 %) 
Bingaman-Specter 2005 level -60% below 2006 levels 226.8  (-44 %) 
Lieberman-McCain 1990 level -60% below 1990 levels 249.8  (-38 %) 
Kerry-Snowe 1990 level -62% below 1990 levels 197.6  (-51 %) 
Sanders-Boxer 1990 level -80% below 1990 levels 184.9  (-54 %) 
Notes:  
1 According to information in the bills or PEW (2008). 2 According to WRI (2008). For Lieberman-Warner and Bingaman-
Specter the “optimistic” scenario is depicted. According to WRI (2007) the cumulated total BAU emissions between 2010 
and 2050 are 401.7 GtCO2. 
Total U.S. GHG emissions in 2005 (2006) were 7,181.4 (7,075.6) MtCO2e, i.e. 117 % (115 %) of 1990 levels (EIA 2007a).  
                                                
 
 
Allowance allocation 
The question how to initially allocate the allowances is a crucial design issue of any cap-and-
trade scheme. All the bills discussed here explicitly propose auctioning of some portion of 
allowances. In other words, the proposals are mixtures of the two basic alternatives for 
allowance allocation – to give allowance away based on some measure of past or current 
behavior or to distribute them through an auction. For example, in the Lieberman-Warner 
proposal 24 percent of allowances would be initially auctioned in 2012, rising to 73 percent in 
2050. On the other hand, the proposal provides transition assistance in the form of free 
 
6 See, for instance, the World Energy Outlook 2007 (IEA 2007), which in the reference scenario (between 2005 
and 2030) assumes an annual GDP growth rate for the U.S. (EU-27) of 2.3 % (2.0 %). 
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allowances for several sectors or institutions. Covered facilities in the electric power sector 
and the industrial sector, for instance, will get a certain fraction of total allowances for free 
(declining from 20 percent in 2012 to one percent in 2035). In addition, roughly three percent 
of the total emission allowance account will be allocated to early actors from 2012 to 2016 
and four percent for carbon capture and storage (CCS) activities from 2012 to 2035. From 
2012-2050, eight percent of the total allowance account will be allocated to states according 
to several criteria such as state’s expenditures for low-income household assistance. Similarly 
to Lieberman-Warner, the Bingaman-Specter proposal envisages an increasing fraction of 
allowances being auctioned and a variety of free allocations to certain sectors or institutions. 
In contrast, the other proposals (Kerry-Snowe, Lieberman-McCain, Sanders-Boxer) require 
the president or an administrative entity to develop the allocation plan, including the share 
auctioned. 
To encourage efforts to reduce GHG emissions before a regulation takes effect, all proposals 
presented here give credit for early reduction. An additional common feature of the federal 
cap-and-trade proposals is that those who receive the free allowances may not be the 
regulated entities. The proposals include several set-aside programs, for example CCS or 
carbon sequestration in agriculture. Social aspects play an important role, too. In particular, 
the more detailed proposals (Bingaman-Specter, Lieberman-McCain, Lieberman-Warner) 
support programs which address the effects of climate policy and of climate change on low-
income households by using action revenues.  
Discussing the options for initial allocation one should take into account that the value of the 
allowances as assets can be considerable. Paltsev et al. (2007) predict the allowance value 
using the Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology. Instead of focusing on particular proposals, they estimated the effects 
of cap-and-trade programs under three scenarios based on cumulative allowances available 
from 2012 to 2050. The potential auction revenues range from $235 billion for the least 
stringent target to $425 billion (in $2005) for the most stringent scenario in 2030. These 
revenues correspond to 8 respectively 14 percent of non-CO2 federal tax revenues in 2030. 
The allocation of permits in the EU has been largely free of charge in the last years with a 
small but growing fraction of auctioning in the individual member states. The current 
proposal by the European Commission suggests auctioning as the basic principle for 
allocation. While in the power sector 100 percent auctioning is proposed from 2013 on, in all 
other sectors there will be an increased fraction of auctioning until almost 100 percent in 
2020, with possible exemptions for the energy intensive industries which are in danger of 
loosing market share to international competitors in non-regulated regions outside the EU. 
The rights to auction the permits are proposed to be allocated to the individual member states 
based on historical emissions shares and to a small fraction (10 percent) to serve solidarity 
purposes within the EU-27 – mainly based on per capita GDP. Therefore, in general, the 
allocation procedure in the EU is also partly used for distributive purposes but seems less 
connected to the burden posed by the carbon regulation itself: While the U.S. proposals often 
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use the revenues for mitigating unwanted social effects of climate policy, the EU distributive 
component is targeted at low-income countries in general and happens at the governmental 
level. As in some of the U.S. proposals a part of the revenues (20 percent) is earmarked for 
green purposes such as contributing to research and development for reducing emissions, 
adaptation measures or to avoiding deforestation. 
Price stability and cost control 
The cap-and-trade schemes provide for flexibility mechanisms designed to reduce market 
volatility and overall costs. Except for Sanders-Boxer, who do not specify this design issue, 
all proposals permit unlimited allowance banking. Some bills permit allowance borrowing: 
Lieberman-McCain permit borrowing up to 25 percent of an entity’s total allowance 
submission requirement in a calendar year, and for a maximum of five years; Lieberman-
Warner allow borrowing up to 15 percent. Borrowing provisions always include an interest 
rate for repayment of allowances. One unique feature of some U.S. cap-and-trade bills is the 
“safety valve”, a price ceiling for allowances. Once the price of allowances reaches the 
ceiling, emitters can purchase additional allowances at the ceiling price from the regulator. 
Although this system may not be rigid on emissions reduction, it can avoid price peaks and 
unexpectedly high compliance costs. Among the discussed proposals in this paper, Bingaman-
Specter propose a safety valve – called “Technology Accelerator Payment” – that starts at $12 
per tCO2e and increases over time. Similarly, Sanders-Boxer specify that if the allowance 
price exceeds a “Technology-Indexed Stop Price” the annual reduction of the emissions cap 
will be abandoned. The stop price is determined by the technology-specific average costs of 
zero-carbon or low-carbon technologies. The Lieberman-Warner proposal contains an 
alternative approach to limit costs: establishing a “Carbon Market Efficiency Board” to 
supervise the allowance market. The board – modeled after the Federal Reserve – would 
ensure that the imposition of limits on GHG emissions does not harm the U.S. economy 
significantly and that the market functions efficiently. In the case of overly high allowance 
prices, the board could, for example, increase the amount of allowances which is available for 
borrowing. From an economic perspective the combination of banking and borrowing as 
instruments to add when-flexibility to a cap-and-trade scheme on the one hand with a safety 
valve as a price-based instrument on the other needs careful design: Triggering the safety 
valve violates the cap and banking and borrowing provisions may transfer these excess 
emissions to other periods. 
Domestic offsets are an additional instrument for cost control. They can be used to achieve 
emissions reductions in sectors that are difficult to regulate directly, and can expand the set of 
low-cost reduction options, thereby lowering the overall cost of a regulatory program.7 Most 
proposals include provisions for domestic offsets which frequently include biological and 
agricultural sequestration, capture and destruction of methane from landfills, agriculture and 
                                                 
7 Offsets from international project-based emission reductions will be discussed later on. 
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coal mines; and CCS projects. There are differences between proposals in the amount of 
offsets available. While Bingaman-Specter does not limit the number of eligible allowances 
from offsets, Lieberman-McCain and Lieberman-Warner cap the number of offsets that can 
be used to 30 percent respectively 15 percent of the total annual allowance requirement. 
Since the environmental integrity is considered very important, in the EU ETS there is no 
safety valve to cap the carbon price. However, some degree of when-flexibility is introduced 
in the current Commission proposal: While full banking is allowed, borrowing is possible 
since the allowances for the past year have to be turned in only after the allowances for the 
current year have been issued to the emitters. Domestic offsets may be possible in the future, 
but the double-counting issue is to be solved beforehand and biological and agricultural 
sequestration is not accepted as equivalent to abatement.  
International aspects 
Due to the global nature of the underlying climate change problem, the proposed bills include 
several international aspects such as linking provisions or other instruments, i.e. border 
measures, to encourage regulation in other nations. A U.S. cap-and-trade system could 
influence international emissions markets through two direct links: the purchase of allowances 
in foreign markets such as EU ETS and offsets generated by the project-based Kyoto 
mechanisms. Firstly, foreign GHG markets could potentially be linked to the U.S. cap-and-
trade system. Bingaman-Specter permits the use of international credits if approved by the 
president based on the results of a review by an interagency group that will take place no later 
than January 2016. Lieberman-Warner also allows the use of foreign credits if the foreign 
market has comparably rigorous monitoring, compliances, and enforcement methods. 
Although the definitions in these proposals are to be finalized during the development of the 
U.S. market, emissions credits from EU ETS or other countries may be eligible for use in the 
U.S. emissions trading scheme. Secondly, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) offers 
opportunities to reduce compliance costs for companies regulated under the U.S. cap-and-
trade system. Lieberman-McCain permits up to 30 percent of allowance submission 
requirements to be satisfied through offset projects in developing countries. Bingaman-
Specter allows projects for international offsets if the president sets up a program for these 
projects based on the results of the already mentioned interagency review.  
Furthermore, there may be interactions between national carbon regulation in the U.S. and 
international carbon prices simply via the impact of the U.S. regulation on trade flows in 
energy intensive goods, which in turn can influence carbon prices. This is, however, an 
indirect effect and driven by altered trade flows of the proposals, not by linking provisions of 
the trading schemes. 
Generally, linking the EU ETS to other schemes is possible, provided that the “environmental 
integrity” is kept. This is typically interpreted in the way that the trading scheme coupled to 
the European one has to have an absolute cap. Therefore, an interesting constellation would 
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emerge if the U.S. chooses a cap-and-trade system with a rather tight cap but a “soft” safety 
valve, which would then likely be triggered. A safety-valve level of the U.S. scheme below 
the allowance prices in the EU ETS might endanger the environmental integrity of the 
European scheme, provoking the EU to prevent a linking between both systems.  
The use of project-based abatement credits is to some extent permitted in the EU proposal. All 
unused permits from the current phase (2008 to 2012) can be carried over to the next phase, 
and credits from projects registered before 2012 delivering credits after 2012 are accepted 
with some special provisions for the least developed countries. It is important to note that in 
the EU the member states can use permits from CDM to fulfill their abatement requirement in 
the sectors not covered by the trading scheme. However, this amount is limited to three 
percent of their respective emission budget per year. 
Besides linking provisions some U.S. proposals intend to encourage regulatory actions among 
other nations. Bingaman-Specter proposes that, after 2020, the president could require 
importers of carbon intensive goods such as iron, aluminum, or cement to submit allowances 
for a product’s carbon content if the country of origin does not have a climate policy 
comparable to the U.S. policy. This mechanism – called “International Reserve Allowance 
Requirements” – could attenuate carbon leakage and could give other countries incentives to 
implement carbon reduction policies. Lieberman-Warner include a similar policy.  
One focus of several U.S. proposals is on technology transfer to developing countries. 
Bingaman-Specter, for instance, include a program to promote GHG reduction in developing 
countries. The bill establishes an “International Energy Technology Deployment Fund” to 
launch low carbon technologies in developing countries. The fund would be established using 
auction revenues and the import requirements discussed above.  
Similar provisions exist in the European proposal. Twenty percent of the auctioning revenues 
are earmarked for activities that include funding research in low-emitting technologies but 
also such activities as supporting abatement in developing countries. Also, the least developed 
countries are provided a special status aimed at facilitating the setting up of abatement 
projects. Furthermore, among the suggestions in order to control leakage similar to 
Bingaman-Specter the proposal envisages including importers in the permit trading regime. 
Additionally, the EU Commission explicitly suggests establishing international sectoral 
agreements. At this point it is in the interest of both the EU and the U.S. to co-ordinate 
possible border measures in order not to generate barriers to free trade among the two 
economic areas. 
Promotion of low-carbon technology 
All proposals contain technology components. Bingaman-Specter proposes that 
approximately half of the revenue from the auction goes to the proposed Energy Technology 
Deployment Fund in order to promote technological innovation to reduce GHG emissions. In 
general, the technology policy of the proposals is characterized by a focus towards CCS 
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technology, i.e. proceeds from auctions are often used for CCS-related programs. Bingaman-
Specter proposes that 28 percent of the fund go to advanced coal and sequestration 
technologies, 7 percent to biofuels (cellulosic biomass ethanol and municipal solid waste 
technology), and 20 percent to advanced technology vehicles. The proposal further suggests 
bonus allowances for CCS. Similarly, Lieberman-Warner grant bonus allowances for CCS 
and establish a fund promoting low-carbon technologies. Furthermore, they specify the legal 
framework for CO2 sequestration including liability issues. 
On top of the technology policies just discussed, Sanders-Boxer and Kerry-Snowe also 
propose other regulatory climate policies such as mandatory energy efficiency standards or 
renewable portfolio standards. Furthermore, both proposals include provisions for vehicle 
emissions standards. Although other proposals have no direct regulation on the transportation 
sector, Bingaman-Specter, Lieberman-McCain, and Lieberman-Warner indirectly regulate the 
transportation sector through increases in gasoline prices, which is induced by upstream 
regulation in their cap-and-trade proposals. 
In addition to earmarking auctioning revenues the European Commission proposes additional 
measures specifically aimed at technological development and a separate framework to 
introduce renewables based on a tradable quota scheme: One of the proposed directives is 
aimed at establishing a legal framework for large scale geological storage of carbon dioxide – 
CCS (COM 2008c). Additionally, guidelines for environmental subsidy schemes within the 
EU have been formulated (COM 2008d). A major element of the proposed legislative package 
in the EU consists of a framework directive aimed at promoting the use of renewable energy 
based on a tradable quota scheme (COM 2008e). The aim is to implement the EU target of 
20 percent of primary energy from renewables in 2020 as compared to 8.5 percent (15 percent 
in electricity) today. The framework consists of individual targets for the member states, who 
will then be allowed to fulfill their obligations by either producing renewable energy or 
buying so-called guarantees of origin which certify excess renewable production in other 
states. It is currently debated to what extent this new regulation would be compatible with 
feed-in-tariff subsidy schemes used in some EU member states, e.g. Germany, which are 
generally perceived to be successful in increasing the renewable share but at the same time 
induce very high costs. 
CO2 prices and impacts on the economy 
The U.S. EPA and the MIT have quantified the economic effects of the new proposals in the 
110th Congress (EPA 2007a, EPA 2008, MIT 2007). Both model predictions exhibit 
uncertainty related to several aspects. One is the uncertainty related to the availability of 
domestic and international offsets. The degree to which new nuclear power is politically and 
socially feasible and whether or not CCS technology will be available at a large scale are 
further open questions. Last but not least, assumptions regarding the carbon regulation of 
major global emitters have to be made. Although providing a helpful reference, these studies 
should be compared with caution since they are not based on identical assumptions. 
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Furthermore, given the many assumptions necessary to model national and global economic 
systems, attention should be paid to the general insights to be gained into the direction of 
changes in the economy and into the approximate magnitude of the price and welfare effects 
to be expected, given alternative features of cap-and-trade design, rather than to the precise 
numerical results.  
 
Table 2: Economic Impacts of Climate Change Bills 
Proposed Bill Allowance Prices in $2005 Effects on GDP in % vs. BAU 
 2020 2050 2020 2050 
Lieberman-Warner1 - - - - 
Bingaman-Specter2 15 65 -0.4 to -0.9 -0.9 to -2.9 
Lieberman-McCain3 16 to 20 70 to 85 -0.4 to -1.0 -1.1 to -3.2 
Kerry-Snowe4 - - - - 
Sanders-Boxer5 65 210 -0.8 -0.9 
Notes:  
1 No data available. However, the cumulative emissions budget under Lieberman-Warner is similar to the one of Sanders-
Boxer and Kerry-Snowe (see Table 1). 2 See EPA (2008). 3 See EPA (2007a). 4 No data available. However, the cumulative 
emissions budget under Kerry-Snowe is only 6.9 % above the one of Sanders-Boxer (see Table 1). 5 See MIT (2007). 
General assumptions on international (i.e. non-U.S.) action: Kyoto-Signatories (except for Russia) follow an allowance path
from the Kyoto emissions levels in 2012 to 50 % below 1990 in 2050. The rest of world adopt a policy beginning in 2025
that returns and holds them at year 2015 emissions levels through 2034, and then returns and maintains them at 2000
emissions levels from 2035 to 2050 (EPA 2007a, EPA 2008, and MIT 2007).  
 
Table 2 shows the available results regarding the impacts of the bills which are under 
consideration. Concerning allowance prices, for Bingaman-Specter and Lieberman-McCain 
rather similar prices are expected. While prices increase for Bingaman-Specter from $15 in 
2020 to $65 in 2050, for McCain-Lieberman prices rise from the range of $16 to $20 in 2020 
to the range of $70 to $85 (in $2005 per tCO2e). In contrast, prices for Sanders-Boxer are 
considerably higher, as they increase from $65 in 2020 to $210 in 2050. The prices vary 
according to differences in the stringency of the cap and the assumptions of the underlying 
models. For Lieberman-Warner and Kerry-Snowe no studies on the economic impacts are 
available, however, based on the estimates of cumulated emissions budgets (see Table 1) a 
comparison with the other bills is possible. 
Estimated impacts on gross domestic product (GDP) also vary across the proposals. Both 
models show negative impacts on the GDP, with losses in the range of one half to one percent 
of business-as-usual GDP for 2020 and in the range of one to three percent for 2050. 
However, one has to bear in mind that the numbers in Table 2 are only valid for cost-efficient 
abatement measures. If additional, cost-inefficient measures (such as mandatory efficiency 
standards) are introduced, total costs for society will be higher. 
There are numerous studies on the impacts of carbon regulation on carbon prices and the 
European economy. For the actual proposal the EU Commission estimates for 2020 a permit 
price in the range of 30€ to 47€ per tCO2 and a comparatively small impact of the proposal on 
European GDP in the range of -0.45 to -0.61 percent vs. BAU (COM 2008b).  
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2.1.2 Evaluation of the Proposals 
The diversity of cap-and-trade proposals to establish a federal U.S. climate policy regulation 
is impressive. The long-term reduction targets of most proposals resemble the order of 
magnitude of the EU targets and may therefore serve as a reference in future post-Kyoto 
negotiations. From an economic perspective, another remarkable feature of all proposals is the 
strong role of auctions and the utilization of auction revenues to promote R&D and 
distributional objectives. On the other hand, the use of mandatory efficiency standards in the 
proposals of Sanders-Boxer and Kerry-Snowe is problematic. Given the ambitious reduction 
targets of both proposals, cost efficiency is a necessary condition for successful 
implementation. If, however, those instruments are introduced in sectors that are part of the 
cap-and-trade scheme, only the costs of abatement will increase without reducing emissions.  
Despite the impressive amount of proposals and the increasing number of studies about the 
proposals’ economic impacts one should not disregard the significant uncertainties every 
economic analysis has to deal with. Among the most important uncertainties is the question to 
what degree CCS technology is technically feasible. In both models used to quantify the 
proposals’ economic impacts (see Table 2), advanced coal with CCS technology begins to 
deploy by 2030 and CO2 emissions from all fossil-fuel generated electricity are being 
captured and stored by 2050. However, if CCS technology is not available, allowance prices 
will be considerably higher (EPA 2007a): In a scenario for the Lieberman-McCain proposal 
assuming that CCS technology is not available, allowance prices are 50 percent higher than in 
the core scenario.8 Another issue is the assumption (see Table 2) that all developed countries 
and to a lesser degree all developing countries will accept and enforce binding emissions 
reductions. This assumption restricts the amount of emissions leakage due to U.S. emissions 
restrictions and has a strong effect on the terms-of-trade effects for the U.S. economy (MIT 
2007, EPA 2007a). 
An obvious question is whether any of the proposals will have a realistic chance to be 
implemented. Among the members of the 110th U.S. Senate, the five proposals presented in 
this paper found broad support. Overall, 37 of the 100 Senators sponsored or co-sponsored at 
least one of the proposals (26 Democrats, 9 Republicans, and 2 Independents). These numbers 
show, however, that active supporters are still a minority in the Senate and that stringent 
climate policy actions are far more popular among Democrats than among Republicans. 
Among the bills presented here, Lieberman-Warner deserves special attention. On 
December 5, 2007 the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee voted to report the 
bill to the full Senate where it will be discussed in 2008. It was the first time a GHG cap-and-
trade bill ever got a majority in a Congressional Committee (PEW 2007). 
                                                 
8 If a safety valve (such as in Bingaman-Specter) were implemented, these mechanisms would be used to a 
greater extent. In this case the emissions in the scenario without CCS would be higher than in the core scenario. 
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2.2 Regional U.S. Programs 
In the absence of federal leadership addressing climate change many U.S. states and regions 
have begun taking action on their own. States are setting targets for reducing their GHG 
emissions, adopting policies to promote renewable energy and energy efficiency, and 
developing statewide climate action plans. In the following, we briefly describe efforts being 
made at the U.S. state level. We focus on a regional cap-and-trade system in the U.S. 
Northeast and on initiatives in California.9 
2.2.1 The RGGI Program 
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is a cooperative effort of (by now) ten 
northeastern states to create a regional cap-and-trade program covering carbon dioxide 
emissions from power plants in the region.10 The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU, 
RGGI 2007c) to create a cap-and-trade system was signed on December 20, 2005, by 
governors of seven states (Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
York, and Vermont). The MoU sets the framework for the cap-and-trade system and refers to 
the RGGI Model Rule (RGGI 2007d) which contains detailed regulations. In 2007, the 
governors of Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Maryland signed agreements to join RGGI. 
Relying on RGGI (2007a), in the following we briefly discuss the main design features of the 
cap-and-trade program. 
Scope and point of regulation 
The RGGI cap-and-trade system for carbon dioxide, the first of its kind in U.S. history, will 
start in 2009. The scope of the system is limited to the power sector. The program affects only 
coal fired, oil fired, and gas fired electric generating units with a capacity of 25 MW or more. 
RGGI is implemented as a “downstream” system, i.e. emitting power plants will need an 
allowance for each ton of CO2 emitted and can buy or sell allowances. According to RGGI 
(2007a), the covered units are responsible for approximately 95 percent of CO2 emissions 
from the power sector. Overall, the system covers roughly 30 percent of the total CO2 
emissions in the participating states.11 The coverage rate, however, differs considerably 
between states. For instance, in Maryland, a state where electricity generation heavily relies 
on coal, roughly 48 percent of state emissions are covered.  
                                                 
9 Another noteworthy regional initiative to reduce greenhouse gases emissions is the Western Climate Initiative 
(WCI), which is a collaboration of meanwhile seven U.S. states and two Canadian Provinces. Several U.S. states, 
Canadian Provinces and one Mexican State are observers to WCI. See http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org. 
10 The total CO2 emissions of participating states amount to 635 MtCO2 in 2004, i.e. 10.7 % of total U.S. CO2 
emissions (EIA 2007b). 
11 According to RGGI (2007b) and CIER (2007), the estimated emissions for covered units in 2004 are 
176 MtCO2, which is roughly 30 % of the total CO2 emissions of participating states. 
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Emissions targets 
The MoU calls for signatory states to stabilize power sector CO2 emissions over the first six 
years of program implementation (2009-2014) at a level slightly above current emissions. 
Taken as a group, the participating states’ emissions in 2004 were roughly 94 percent of the 
MoU’s total cap on emissions of roughly 188 MtCO2. Based on RGGI’s 2004 estimates, only 
one state, New Hampshire, had emissions that exceeded the MoU allotment. However, the 
construction of additional fossil fuel generation or the reinstatement of retired fossil fuel 
capacity due to demand growth could easily push several states above the cap. After 2014, the 
program implements an emissions decline of 2.5 percent per year for the four years 2015 to 
2018. This approach will result in a 2018 annual emissions budget that is 10 percent smaller 
than the initial 2009 annual emissions budget. Compared to the actual emissions of covered 
sources in 2004 (the BAU emissions), RGGI will lead to a 4 percent (13 percent) reduction of 
emissions in 2018.12  
Allowance allocation 
The MoU establishes an emissions budget and divides the budget among participating states. 
RGGI takes an innovative approach to how states allocate allowances to regulated sources. 
Instead of giving allowances directly to electric generators for free, states will sell a 
significant portion or all allowances through a regional auction or otherwise. In the MoU, 
participating states have agreed to allocate a 25 percent minimum of allowances to support 
programs for “consumer benefit or strategic energy purpose”. These programs may promote 
energy efficiency, directly mitigate electricity ratepayer impacts or support non-carbon based 
energy technologies as well as innovative carbon emissions abatement technologies. 
Participating states may choose how to allocate the remaining 75 percent of their allowances, 
but the clear trend among the RGGI states is to auction nearly all of their allowances and 
dedicate the proceeds to support such programs.13  
States participating in RGGI are currently discussing the design of a regional auction platform 
and the components of regulatory provisions necessary for implementing a regional auction. 
Holt et al. (2007) propose a uniform price auction, at which the clearing price is the value of 
the highest rejected bid in order to ensure an efficient allocation of allowances. This auction 
should use a single-round, sealed bid format and should be held for different vintages (spot 
and forward). However, in a comment on this study, Cramton (2007) argued that an ascending 
clock auction – where the emerging price is common knowledge – would be superior to the 
proposed sealed bid auction. The primary disadvantage of the sealed bid auction in the RGGI 
                                                 
12 Except for Maryland, according to current RGGI estimates (http://www.rggi.org). 
13 New York, Massachusetts, Vermont, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Maine have publicly stated their 
commitment to auction 100 %, or nearly 100 %, of their allowances to support “consumer benefit and strategic 
energy” programs. 
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setting is the potential to have prices for the two vintages that do not reflect the bidders’ 
preferences.14 
Price stability and cost control 
The RGGI Model Rule includes a number of temporal flexibility mechanisms, i.e. banking, 
extended compliance period, and early reduction allowances.15 Banking is possible without 
restrictions and provides facilities with the opportunity to carry over unused allowances from 
a current compliance period into future compliance periods. Therefore, banking should 
provide allowance price stability while providing an incentive to hedge against future year 
emissions uncertainty. The Model Rule provides for a three-year compliance period. This 
compliance period can be extended to four years in the event of a stage-two trigger event (see 
“price triggers” below).  
The MoU and Model Rule include allowance price triggers, which provide additional 
compliance flexibility and price dampening in the event of higher allowance prices in two 
distinct stages. A stage-one trigger event occurs if the twelve-month rolling average 
allowance price is equal to or greater than the stage-one trigger price ($7 in $2005, adjusted to 
the CPI). In this case covered units will be able to expand their use of offset allowances from 
3.3 percent (this is the initial restriction for the use of offsets) of their compliance obligation 
to 5 percent. A stage-two trigger event occurs if the twelve-month rolling average allowance 
price is equal to or greater than the stage-two trigger price ($10 in $2005, adjusted to the CPI + 
2 percent).16 In this case: (1.) covered units will be able to use offset allowances to satisfy 
10 percent of their compliance obligation, (2.) the compliance period will be extended to four 
years, and (3.) offset allowances may be awarded for the permanent retirement of GHG 
allowances or credits that have been issued pursuant to mandatory carbon constraining 
programs outside the U.S.. 
In order to ensure that the offsets represent equivalent emissions reductions or permanent 
carbon sequestration, specific standards were developed for specific project categories. At this 
time, for RGGI only five project categories are eligible for offsets: (1.) landfill CH4 capture 
and destruction, (2.) SF6 emission reduction, (3.) afforestation, (4.) reduction of CO2 
emissions from natural gas, oil, or propane combustion due to higher energy efficiency in the 
building sector, and (5.) avoided CH4 emissions from agricultural manure management 
operations. 
                                                 
14 In the uniform-price, sealed-bid auction each bidder must submit their demand curve in advance, i.e. the 
bidder must guess the demands of others for the two products (spot and forward). A wrong guess can lead to 
wrong prices: Prices for spot allowances may be higher than for forwards, which is not consistent with rational 
payoff maximization because banking is not restricted.  
15 Allowance borrowing between compliance periods, however, is not allowed. 
16 The price trigger provisions include a 14-month market settling period, which commences at the start of each 
new compliance period. The twelve-month rolling averages used to calculate the stage-one and stage-two trigger 
events cannot include the 14-month market settling period.  
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Currently, RGGI does not consider a formal link to the EU ETS. This means that covered 
entities in the RGGI region cannot purchase EU ETS emission allowances for compliance and 
RGGI allowances are not accepted for compliance in the EU. 
CO2 prices and impacts on the economy 
There are two studies investigating the expected RGGI allowance prices and the effects of the 
cap-and-trade system on the economy of participating states. Firstly, RGGI has its own formal 
modeling analysis (see http://www.rggi.org). Under the so-called “package” scenario the 
following assumptions are made: (1.) the use of offsets is limited to 50 percent of the required 
reduction, (2.) GHG emissions are capped after 2020, and (3.) current levels of annual state 
expenditures for public benefit programs continue through 2025 , whereas the effects of these 
programs have not been accounted for in the baseline scenario. Under these conditions, RGGI 
results in allowance prices which increase from $2 (in $2004) in 2010 to $5 in 2024. In addition 
to RGGI’s own prediction, CIER (2007) also estimated the price of allowances using an 
electricity market model. In their prediction, the allowance price is expected to increase from 
$4 (in $2004) in 2010 to $11 in 2025. The different price projections in both studies are caused 
by several differences in the underlying model assumptions.17 
Because RGGI is a regional program, a natural question is the extent to which imposing 
restrictions on CO2 emissions from generators covered by RGGI will lead to higher emissions 
from generators not covered by the regulation, i.e. either from small power stations 
(<25 MW) within the RGGI region or from units located outside the region. The term 
“leakage” is used to refer to emissions increases outside the RGGI system as a result of the 
merely limited sectoral and regional scarcity of CO2. Estimating leakage, one has to consider 
the operational and economic characteristics of the electronic power system within the RGGI 
region. One major issue is that the regional coverage of RGGI is not congruent with the 
regional coverage of the electricity network. According to RGGI (2007b), estimated 
emissions leakage amounts to 27 percent of net CO2 emissions through 2015, i.e. leakage 
seems to be a significant problem. 
2.2.2 Initiatives in California 
In the U.S. environmental policy, regulation at the state level has always played an important 
role. In particular, California – the state with the highest population and largest GDP among 
U.S. states – has been leading other states as well as the federal government in environmental 
                                                 
17 One important difference is the fact that the CIER study assumes the value of 25 % of the allowances created 
by the program to be available for investment in energy efficiency, while in the RGGI study the amount of 
money devoted to energy efficiency investment is not tied to the amount of auction revenues, but to recent (and 
higher) levels of investment in energy efficiency instead. The RGGI analysis finds a 5 % reduction in electricity 
demand due to higher energy efficiency in 2024, while the CIER analysis finds only a 2 % reduction. Therefore, 
the demand for emissions allowances is lower in the RGGI analysis than in the CIER analysis, which contributes 
to the difference in allowance prices. 
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regulation.18 In 1963, for instance, California implemented the first motor vehicle emissions 
control in the U.S., several years before the federal government began to deal with such 
issues. In 1971, the first NOx standards for cars and light trucks were introduced in the state 
(Hanemann 2007). Even if the causality between California’s environmental regulation and its 
low carbon dioxide emissions remains to be proven, the state’s per-capita emissions are still 
among the lowest in the country.19 In the following, we describe some recent climate policy 
initiatives in California and their importance for the federal policy (Hanemann 2007 and 
MAC 2007). In doing so, we distinguish between general regulation at the state’s level and 
measures to abate GHG emissions in specific sectors. 
Setting the stage – Assembly Bill 32 
On June 1, 2005, Governor Schwarzenegger signed Executive Order S-3-05, which 
established GHG emissions targets for the state. The targets aim at reducing emissions to 
2000 levels by 2010, to 1990 levels by 2020, and to 80 percent below 1990 levels by 2050. 
The Executive Order set targets, but it did not specify how the targets were to be met. On 
September 27, 2006, the Governor signed Assembly Bill 32 (AB 32), titled “The Global 
Warming Solutions Act of 2006”. This legislation set an enforceable target of reducing the 
state’s GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2020. Compared to the business-as-usual scenario it 
implies a reduction by 29 percent (CAT 2006). The Act covers all GHG gases defined in the 
Kyoto Protocol. It puts the California Air Resources Board (CARB) in charge of adopting the 
necessary measures to achieve the emissions target and allows for the use of market 
mechanisms. In particular, CARB is required to “achieve the maximum technologically 
feasible and cost-effective greenhouse gas emission reduction” (AB 32 2006, 38560). 
Furthermore, a timeline is set: Regulations to achieve the 2020 emissions target must be 
adopted by 2011 and enforced by 2012. The Act, however, also includes a provision which 
may attenuate the costs of emissions abatement at the expense of environmental effectiveness: 
“In the event of extraordinary circumstances, catastrophic events, or threat of significant 
economic harm, the Governor may adjust the applicable deadlines for individual regulations, 
or for the state in the aggregate, to the earliest feasible date after that deadline” (AB 32 
2006, 38599 (a)). 
AB 32 is generally expected to be implemented with a cap-and-trade program. An initial step 
toward the creation of a cap-and-trade program was taken when the Market Advisory 
Committee to CARB was created. In June 2007, the Committee delivered its 
recommendations to CARB (MAC 2007), including the following four key provisions. 
Firstly, the program should include all major GHG-emitting sectors of the economy 
                                                 
18 The State of California has 36.5 million inhabitants, i.e. approximately 12.2 % of total U.S. population. The 
state’s GDP is 1,518.9 billion $2000, i.e. approximately 13.5 % of total U.S. GDP. See http://www.census.gov/. 
19 Only the District of Columbia and Rhode Island have lower per-capita CO2 emissions than California 
(approximately 11 ton CO2 per capita). For comparison, the U.S. per-capita CO2 emissions are approximately 
20 ton CO2 per capita. 
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(including transportation and refining). The Committee estimated that this would cover 
approximately 83 percent of emissions in the state. Secondly, because of the special 
challenges associated with electricity generation, the Committee recommended a “first seller” 
approach: The entity that first sells electricity in the state is responsible for meeting the 
compliance obligation. For electricity generated within California, the owner or operator 
would be the compliant party, and for imported power it would be the party selling power into 
the state’s transmission grid. Thirdly, auctioning should be a key part of allowance allocation 
under the cap-and-trade program. In the near term, however, the state should retain flexibility 
to allocate a share of allowances to certain sectors for free. In the long run, all allowances 
should be auctioned. Finally, the Committee recommended generous use of offsets, but is 
opposed to a safety valve on the price of allowances. 
Mandatory standards 
Across the economy, California is already implementing a variety of policies with the aim of 
reducing carbon dioxide emissions. One state policy related to electricity but with a clear 
motivation aimed at achieving climate-related goals is Senate Bill 1368. This bill directs the 
regulative authorities to set a GHG performance standard to ensure that new long-term 
financial commitments in baseload power plants by electric load-serving entities have GHG 
emissions that are as low as or lower than emissions from a combined-cycle natural gas power 
plant. The standard applies irrespective of whether the power is generated within state borders 
or imported from plants in other states.  
Another remarkable policy is AB 1493, requiring CARB to adopt regulations to reduce GHG 
emissions from new motor vehicles sold in California. These standards would require a 
30 percent reduction in GHG emissions from new vehicles by 2016, with the cutbacks to 
begin in 2009 models. Several other states have since committed to adopting this standard. 
California requires a waiver from the U.S. EPA to implement these standards.20 However, on 
December 19, 2007, the U.S. EPA denied California to set its own standards for CO2 
emissions because the proposed state’s regulations were pre-empted by federal authority and 
would challenge the more stringent fuel economy standards of the 2007 federal energy bill.21 
California has sued U.S. EPA to reverse the waiver denial (California 2008). 
                                                 
20 In the 1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Act, U.S. states have been allowed to impose controls for motor 
vehicles that are more stringent than the national standard, if those standards are needed to meet a state’s 
“compelling and extraordinary conditions” (Clean Air Act, Section 209b). In order to obtain such an exemption, 
a state has to apply for a waiver by the U.S. EPA.  
21 In his letter to Governor Schwarzenegger, U.S. EPA administrator Johnson states “Unlike other air pollutants 
covered by previous waivers, greenhouse gases … contribute to the problem of global climate change, a problem 
that poses challenges for the entire nation and indeed the world … In light of the global nature of the problem of 
climate change, I have found that California does not have a ‘need to meet compelling and extraordinary 
conditions’” (EPA 2007b). 
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Risks to California’s leadership in climate policy 
Given the reluctance of the federal government to take action, the implementation of within-
state climate policy regulation faces several severe problems (Stavins et al. 2007). Firstly, 
similarly to RGGI, leakage would be an issue if California were to implement the reduction 
targets according to AB 32 while the federal government did not enforce similar targets at the 
national level. Leakage occurs when market adjustments resulting from a regulation cause an 
increase in emissions that offsets some (or all) of the emission reductions directly achieved by 
that regulation. Even if regulation of the power sector is designed to cover imported 
electricity, it remains open whether this can avoid leakage. For instance, policies to reduce 
consumption of out-of-state coal-fired electricity generation (such as Senate Bill 1368) would 
not have the expected effect on emissions if that generation were simply reallocated to serve 
demand in other states. Furthermore, trading in energy intensive goods and services would 
also be affected by the differences in carbon prices between California and other U.S. states. 
Secondly, interactions between policies present additional opportunities for emissions 
leakage. In particular, emission reductions resulting from one policy may diminish the amount 
of emission reductions that another policy can achieve. According to Stavins et al. (2007), the 
most significant example of this type of leakage is the interaction between California’s 
vehicle GHG emissions standards (AB 1493) and federal fuel economy standards. 
California’s standards have the effect of requiring car manufacturers to increase the average 
fuel economy of vehicles sold in California. However, those manufacturers also must meet 
federal Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards. Because CAFE standards are 
average nationwide standards, sales of more fuel-efficient vehicles in California make it 
possible for manufacturers to sell less fuel-efficient (higher emitting) vehicles in remaining 
states while still meeting federal CAFE standards. That is, California’s standards may lead to 
increased vehicle emissions elsewhere in the United States, relative to what those emissions 
would have been absent California’s standard. Hence, while California’s vehicle GHG 
emissions standards may achieve emission reductions within California, they may simply 
concentrate the costs of meeting federal CAFE standards on Californians while having a far 
smaller net effect on national emissions. 
Thirdly, the true costs and benefits of California’s ambitious reduction targets have to be 
identified yet. Although several studies indicate that California can meet its 2020 target at no 
net economic cost, Stavins et al. (2007) demonstrate that these studies substantially 
underestimate the cost of meeting California’s 2020 target and at the same time overestimate 
savings that some of those efforts yield through improved energy efficiency.  
2.2.3 Evaluation of Regional Programs 
Given the current reluctance of the federal government to take action, regional U.S. climate 
policies face a dilemma. On the one hand, many states’ governments have the political goal to 
find ways to reduce GHG emissions. Thus the number of states making commitments to 
reduce emissions is rising. On the other hand, in the competitive environment of the U.S. 
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economy, leakage of emissions is a huge problem. Given this constellation, hardly any 
significant contribution by regional initiatives can be expected.22 However, in the U.S. 
environmental policy, regulation at the state level has always played an important role. In 
several cases, states such as California have been leading other states as well as the federal 
government in environmental regulation. It seems plausible that much of the effort currently 
observed in the U.S. Congress is indeed fuelled by the diverse set of regulation in different 
U.S. states. The reason may not only be a public demand for climate policy as such, but also 
the pressure to have one harmonized federal legislation rather than fragmented approaches on 
the state level making it more complicated for the regulated companies to comply. 
Due to the extended legislative power at the EU level in environmental policy the situation 
appears rather different in Europe. The most important – and typically rather ambitious – 
proposals are often initiated at the European level and normally take the form of framework 
directives, which allow for more or less flexibility when implemented at the member state 
level. In other words, the evolution of environmental policy regulation seems remarkably 
different in the two federal systems European Union and United States. 
2.3. Climate and Energy Policy after the Bush Administration 
While the nomination process of the Democratic Party for the U.S. presidential elections in 
November 2008 is not finished yet, in the following, we describe the candidates' positions on 
climate and energy policy. We focus on Senator Hillary Clinton (D), Senator Barack Obama 
(D), and the nominee of the Republican Party, Senator John McCain (R). 
2.3.1 Positions of the Democratic Candidates 
According to Clinton, the U.S. is confronted with two major energy-related challenges – 
global climate change and increasing reliance on foreign oil. Regarding climate change, an 
active policy on these issues is crucial for the U.S. (Clinton 2007a): 
“We need to take immediate steps to address this [climate] problem. Critics contend 
that action will be too costly, but I believe that action is both an environmental 
necessity and an economic opportunity. By putting the right incentives in place, we will 
drive American businesses to innovate, creating new products and new jobs. Failing to 
act is the riskier course to both our environment and our economy.”  
In order to tackle both problems, the main objectives of her policy are: (1.) reducing GHG 
emissions to 1990 levels by 2020 and to 80 percent below 1990 levels by 2050, (2.) cutting 
foreign oil imports by two-thirds as compared to projected levels by 2030, (3.) doubling the 
federal investment in basic energy research, (4.) funding a $50 billion Strategic Energy Fund 
(SEF) for investments in alternative energy, and (5.) increasing the fraction of electricity 
                                                 
22 The quite modest emissions reductions for RGGI (see section 2.2.1) illustrate the dilemma U.S. states are 
confronted with. While California’s reduction targets are ambitious their implementation is still pending. 
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generated by renewables to 25 percent in 2025 (Clinton 2007b). According to Clinton, these 
measures will create at least 5 million jobs and transform the U.S. economy into an “efficient 
green” economy. 
A cap-and-trade system is the backbone of Clinton’s plans to reduce U.S. GHG emissions. 
Besides setting ambitious targets, the plan envisages 100 percent auctioning of allowances. 
Clinton promises to transform the U.S. economy from carbon-based to clean and energy 
efficient, jumpstarting research and development through the $50 billion SEF and doubling 
federal investment in basic energy research. The SEF, paid for in part by oil companies, aims 
to fund investments in alternative energy. The fund will finance one-third of the $150 billon 
ten-year investment in a “new energy future”.  
Clinton also aims to spur the green building industry by funding the retrofitting and 
modernization of 20 million low-income homes, and takes concrete steps to reduce electricity 
consumption, including enacting strict appliance efficiency standards and phasing out 
incandescent light bulbs. Furthermore, Clinton plans to reduce electricity consumption by 
20 percent from projected levels in 2030. By the same year, fuel efficiency standards (CAFE) 
should be increased to 55 miles per gallon, whereas the federal government will help 
automakers retool their production facilities through $20 billion in “Green Vehicle Bonds”.  
In her position as Senator of the 110th Congress, Clinton was relatively active in supporting 
climate and energy related legislation. She co-sponsored the “Global Warming Pollution 
Reduction Act” in 2007 (see S. 309 in section 2.1) and the “Climate Stewardship and 
Innovation Act of 2007” (S. 280). Furthermore, she sponsored the “Strategic Energy Fund Act 
of 2006” which aimed at establishing a $50-billion fund to create a research agency focused 
on reducing the threat of global warming and to invest in clean energy technologies. 
Not surprisingly, the positions of Obama, the second Democratic candidate in the race for the 
nomination, are quite similar to those of Clinton. Global climate change and dependence on 
foreign oil from regions hostile to the U.S. are highly ranked on his agenda, too. Among his 
priorities are (1.) reducing GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2020 and to 80 percent below 
1990 levels by 2050, (2.) reducing oil consumptions by at least 35 percent or 10 million 
barrels of oil by 2030, (3.) doubling the federal investment in basic energy research, (4.) 
invest $150 billion in alternative energy over the next ten years, (5.) increasing the fraction of 
electricity generated by renewables to 25 percent in 2025, and (6.) reducing the energy 
intensity of the U.S. economy by 50 percent by 2030 (Obama 2007b). 
Leadership in international climate policy is an additional concern on Obama’s agenda. In a 
recent article, he emphasizes the global dimensions of the climate change problem and the 
challenge for the U.S. (Obama 2007a):  
“As the world's largest producer of greenhouse gases, America has the responsibility to 
lead. While many of our industrial partners are working hard to reduce their emissions, 
we are increasing ours at a steady clip …. As president, I intend to enact a cap-and-
trade system that will dramatically reduce our carbon emissions. ... Getting our own 
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house in order is only a first step. ... We need a global response to climate change that 
includes binding and enforceable commitments …” 
Unlike Clinton, however, Obama also emphasizes that a shift in the direction of energy and 
climate policy will cause costs to the U.S. households.23 Other positions – such as the 
intention to implement a cap-and-trade scheme and to auction 100 percent of allowances or to 
increase CAFE standards to 55 miles per gallon – are identical to Clinton. Like Clinton, 
Senator Obama co-sponsored the “Global Warming Pollution Reduction Act” of 2007 
(S. 309) and the “Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act” of 2007 (S. 280). 
2.3.2 Positions of the Republican Candidate 
As a republican, McCain has quite a remarkable record in the field of climate and energy 
policy. In particular, he emphasizes the necessity of a global agreement in order to tackle 
climate change (McCain 2007):  
“… greenhouse gases are contributing to the warming of our earth and we have an 
obligation to take action to fix it. I believe that America did the right thing by not 
joining the Kyoto Treaty. But I believe that if we could get China and India into it, then 
the United States should seriously consider -- on our terms -- joining with every other 
nation in the world to try to reduce greenhouse gases. It's got to be a global effort.” 
Similar to Clinton and Obama, among the issues related to climate change McCain puts 
special weight on energy security. However, contrary to his possible opponents in the 
presidential race, McCain has already sponsored a bill in the U.S. Senate. Together with 
Senator Lieberman he sponsored the “Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2007” 
(S. 280 2007) in the 110th Congress (see section 2.1). On the other hand, besides this proposal 
McCain has not developed a transparent concept of how to go ahead in climate policy if he 
were to win the elections. This may be partly due to strong reservations with respect to 
climate policy within his own party. A first sign of disputes to be expected within the 
Republican Party was the discussion during the nomination process in 2007 about the implicit 
gasoline tax caused by the Lieberman-McCain proposal. The U.S. EPA (EPA 2007a) 
estimated that the tax will be approximately $0.26 cents in $2005 per gallon of gasoline by 
2030 and $0.68 cents per gallon by 2050. This caused a huge debate about the consequences 
for the U.S. car industry in particular (see for example Cordato 2008). 
2.3.3 What may Europe expect from the new U.S. President? 
Despite the uncertainty with respect to the presidential race in 2008 we can draw some 
conclusions regarding the positions of the new administration in the field of climate and 
                                                 
23 In a speech during his campaign (Obama 2007c), he noted: “Make no mistake – developing the next 
generation of energy will be one of the greatest challenges that this generation of Americans will ever face. It 
will not be easy. It will not come without costs or without sacrifice. And if anyone tries to tell you otherwise, they 
are either fooling themselves or trying to fool you.”  
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energy policy. Firstly, the new U.S. President will have a significantly different position on 
climate policy than his or her predecessor. We can expect that the new administration will 
strive for an active role of the U.S. in international climate policy. Secondly, the new 
president – being a former member of the U.S. Senate – has already gained experience in 
climate and energy legislation as he or she has sponsored or co-sponsored at least one of the 
cap-and-trade bills discussed in section 2.1. Another question is, however, to what extent 
these bills can be converted into binding legislation. As we have seen, there is significant 
support in the U.S. Senate for climate regulation, but much uncertainty remains, regarding, for 
instance, the successful communication of costs caused by climate policy to the U.S. public 
and the behavior of major trading partners which do not plan to commit to binding emission 
reductions (such as China and Mexico). Thirdly, it seems that the new president will continue 
to focus on U.S. energy security, but will combine this issue with a stronger commitment in 
climate policy. 
3. Relevance of U.S. Activities to European Climate Policy 
U.S. climate policy is important for European climate policy on different levels. Firstly, a 
more active climate policy would help the United States to assume leadership in shaping 
future international climate policy architectures. This may help, but on the other hand also 
challenge the role of today’s leaders in international climate policy, one of which is the EU. 
Secondly, as exporters to the U.S. market many European firms are competing with U.S. and 
other firms not located within the EU. It is in Europe’s own interest to be informed about the 
regulation those competitors are subject to. Furthermore, European regulators and policy 
makers may use the approaches and experiences of U.S. domestic policy design in order to 
identify ways to improve the efficiency and thereby the overall cost burden of implementing 
the emission targets. In the following, we briefly discuss potential effects of U.S. climate 
policy activities on the international level of regulation on the one hand and domestic 
European climate policy on the other. 
3.1 Post-2012 Negotiations 
In any case the implementation of a cap-and-trade system would signal that the climate 
change issue is a long term concern in U.S. politics. Even if the actual reductions appear 
somewhat less ambitious at the beginning, taking on the (economic and political) fixed cost of 
implementing such a scheme increases the credibility of longer term dedication to the subject. 
This is supported by the fact that the longer term goals seem more in line with European 
preferences than the ambitions in the coming decade. Reaching general agreement on longer 
term targets may therefore be easier – at least between the U.S. and the EU.  
On the other hand this does not imply that the U.S. will join the Kyoto process or any very 
similar consecutive agreement. In fact, if the U.S. as a dominant superpower in almost any 
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policy field with international relevance assumes a leading role in international climate policy, 
it can be expected to shape this international policy process. From U.S. positions towards the 
Kyoto Protocol as well as from U.S. activities on the international level to date – such as the 
proposal to include only the largest emitters in negotiations or the Asia pacific agreement on 
climate change with limited membership – it should be obvious that U.S. support for the 
Kyoto approach is not likely. The emergence of the United States as a major player in 
international climate policy might rather generate alternative architectures to the Kyoto-type 
approach – possibly leaning towards a so-called big emitters club trying to somehow include 
countries such as China and India. This will challenge the EU preference towards the 
multilateral Kyoto framework but it may move international climate policy forward and may 
help to improve the international architecture in terms of effectiveness and efficiency.24 
In any case, a more active role of the U.S. in international climate policy will increase the 
pressure on developing countries with a strongly growing economy such as China and India to 
commit to binding reduction targets. The strong weight of reciprocity in the cap-and-trade 
proposals regarding emissions reduction in the U.S. on the one hand and major trading 
partners at the other reveal how important this policy issue is for U.S. policy makers 
independently from their party affiliation. 
3.2 Implications for an EU Climate Policy 
Comparing the different regulatory schemes can be rewarding also in the sense of further 
developing the regulatory environment in the European Union. Especially the larger scope of 
the potential U.S. trading scheme covering sectors such as transport fuels which are not 
included in emissions trading in the EU should be of interest. The limited coverage of carbon 
trading in Europe is one of the major sources for larger scale inefficiencies since it requires 
the division of the emissions budget between the regulatory regimes in a cost-minimizing 
way. A larger scope would solve this problem via the trading mechanism but can involve the 
mix of downstream trade of end-users (as in the EU) with upstream trade (e.g. among 
refineries). If implemented successfully this could be considered an alternative for the 
European regulation in the transport sector – which has yet failed to generate a credible and 
uniform carbon price signal as opposed to the carbon trading scheme. 
Other issues of concern on both sides of the Atlantic are measures to prevent production from 
moving to other – potentially less stringently regulated – regions (leakage). Some of those 
measures such as border tax adjustments may have a direct impact on international trade. It is 
advisable to co-ordinate these border measures with the main trading partners – potentially 
also along the provisions of international trade law. 
                                                 
24 A priori, it cannot be excluded that this process will lead to a fragmented international climate policy regime. 
This would be in line with recent findings on coalition formation in the (non-cooperative) global warming game. 
According to Eyckmans and Finus (2006) the socially optimal coalition is usually not stable because of strong 
free rider incentives. However, parallel existing small coalitions – consisting of several regions – may fill the gap 
between the efficient solution and Nash behavior. 
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Last but not least it will be instructive to observe how the Unites States attempt to solve 
public good problems such research and development efforts in the energy sector or in other 
related technologies aiming at mitigation or adaptation by generating auctioning revenues. In 
addition, the U.S. experience gained by the diversity of specific programs supporting low-
income households adversely affected by climate regulation and climate change may offer 
alternative policy instruments for European politicians who are confronted with the same 
distributional problems. Similarly, emission reduction equivalents generated from land use 
change and forestry measures are traditionally regarded with skepticism in Europe, but will 
play an important role internationally – especially in the longer run. Here, U.S. policy may 
generate valuable experience. 
4. Conclusions 
It remains to be seen whether the United States will actually adopt binding targets for 
themselves that generate substantial emission abatement with respect to the business-as-usual 
scenario until the middle of this century. After all, even one percent of the GDP in 2050 
amounts to an absolute cost of several hundred billion dollars. But substantial and credible 
proposals are debated and developed in the legislative process. On the whole compared to 
European policies the proposals seem to have less ambitious targets in the short run but 
envisage comparable targets in the longer run. This may reflect the larger role of fundamental 
technology improvements in U.S. policy implying that once the technologies are there it will 
be easier to reduce emissions. 
In any case, the implementation of a federal climate policy such as a cap-and-trade scheme 
will be a precondition for the U.S. to take a leading role in the international climate policy 
process. This is likely to vitalize international discussions about an international architecture. 
On the other hand, nothing suggests that the U.S. will simply side with the EU to support the 
multilateral Kyoto-type policies. It will rather challenge traditional views and present 
alternatives. Whether this will help the climate or not remains to be seen. Nevertheless, there 
is reason to hope that things turn out as they should between market economies: competition 
increases efficiency and is usually beneficial.     
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